1 Introduction and aims
Understood as what it is—an existential claim—it is safe to assume that we have counterfactual knowledge. This claim would be true even if we only knew a few trivial counterfactuals like: If I were there, I would be there. It is also un-controversial that we have non-trivial counterfactual knowledge. I know that if I were a seven-year-old human, I would have blood. Although I haven’t flipped the £ 1 coin in my pocket, I know that if I had flipped it, it would most likely end up in tails or heads. I know that if I ate an Amanita phalloides, I would be severely poisoned. I know also that, in the scenario Williamson describes in [Williamson 2007, 142], if the bush hadn’t been there, the rock would have ended in the lake. When I say that it is uncontroversial that we know those counterfactuals, I intend to be understood as saying that, mostly, it’s those who are sceptic about counterfactual knowledge in general that would find their knowability controversial.
But t...
