In investigations concerning the problem of truth in the physical sciences, the correspondence theory of truth has frequently been thought of as the most eminent. Although the correspondence theory admits various different formulations, the core of any correspondence theory is the idea that a proposition is true if and only if it corresponds to or matches reality. The classicalversion of the theory describes this relationship as a correspondence to the facts about the world, e.g., [Burgess & Burgess 2011, 70–72]. If so, then adopting a correspondence theory of truth amounts to endorsing instances of the following scheme:
[CF] The proposition that P is true if and only if P corresponds to a fact.
Alternatively, if one construes the notion of a “fact” in terms of the weaker notion of an obtaining “state of affairs”, as in an Austin-type theory, then, [CF] is re-expressed as follows:
[CS] The proposition that P is true if and only if there is a state of affairs X such that P...